The Army, a Power Factor

Call Number
350-1-1:470/2

General information

Call No.:
350-1-1:470/2
Part of series
HU OSA 350-1-1 Records of the International Monitor Institute: Europe: Balkan Archive
Located at
BetaSP NTSC #470 / No. 2
Digital ver. identifier
HU_OSA_00000470
Original Title
Machtfaktor Armee
Date of air
1991-09-10
Date
1991
Level
Item
Primary Type
Moving image
Language
German
Duration
10 min.

Content

Form/Genre
Documentary film
Contents Summary
This broadcast gives a detailed analysis of the JNA, its history, weaponry, and the role it played in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Most of the report's images come from archival military and documentary films featuring JNA weaponry and arms factories, mixed in with more recent combat footage from Croatia and Slovenia. The report begins by stating that despite the JNA having always been the pride and joy of Yugoslavia's multi-ethnic federation, it turned on it's own people when Yugoslavia began to break up. As HTV footage of destruction in Croatia and Slovenia shows, the predominantly-Serbian generals are described as having their own agenda, irrespective of what Stipe Mesic, rotating chair of the Yugoslav Federal Council, or any other politicians had to say. The report's narrator then poses questions regarding the intentions of the JNA and its agenda while showing archival footage of JNA weaponry and modern footage of tanks driving through civilian areas. The report states that some 100,000 people are employed by Yugoslavia's defense industry, concentrated in Serbia. Tito is said to have asserted his role in the non-aligned bloc by selling his state's weapons to other member nations in the third world. The report states that the terrain of Croatia and Slovenia is ideal for the 700 JNA tanks stationed there (of an overall 2,200). The reports continues describing the JNA arsenal while showing archival footage cataloging the many types of JNA weapons. Footage of damaged houses and other civilian destruction caused by JNA artillery divisions in Petrinje, Croatia is shown. The report states that the JNA maintained an overall 60 multiple rocket launchers at that time. The JNA's larger missile arsenals are detailed as well, including the R 60, described as having a target range of 60 to 70 kilometers, and the R 300, shown mounted on military trucks with launching devices and described as an improved version of the Soviet SCUD missile. The report then shows archival clips of a promotional film from the JNA's Air Force while detailing the different jets such as the Yugoslavian-made Galeb and Eagle, and the Russian-made MIG 21. The report states that the JNA maintains approximately 150 MIGs, yet only half are ready for combat, and even fewer of that total could be manned because of the Slovenian and Croatian officers that deserted in opposition to bombing their own people. Some 150 to 200 armed helicopters are also shown and described as ready for placement by the JNA, but pilots for these aircraft are in dwindling numbers as well. The bombs and rockets of the aircrafts are featured, combined with scenes of destruction showing the aftermath of attacks using such weapons. Russian Defense Minister Yasov's relationship with Serbian JNA generals Kadijevic and Adzic is then focused on, showing how Russia supplied military support for Serbia's aggression. The report shows the link between the military and nationalist ideologues in the former Yugoslavia, briefly mentioning the renowned memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. Territorial ambitions of a "Greater Serbia" are outlined amid footage of Vojislav Seselj and Slobodan Milosevic speaking at nationalist rallies. The report states that the reorganization of the JNA in 1985 shifted further authority to Belgrade, allowing for greater complicity with the agenda of a "Greater Serbia" by making light to middle-weight weaponry readily available to Serbian civilians and bands of Cetniks in border regions, including footage of specific types of arms and Cetnik paraphernalia. The effect of the JNA's reduction in overall numbers from 1.1 million down to 230,000 is also analyzed, mainly due to the loss of its multiethnic reserves. This, according to the report, fits perfectly within the goals of a "Greater Serbia" because it creates an ethnically-pure Serbian army out of the JNA, with poorly-paid reservists available for placement to key areas such as Sandzak, Vojvodina, and Kosovo, often against the wishes of their own wives. Many non-Serbian soldiers are said to have deserted. The report states that due to losses in Slovenia, a new plan was developed under the title " BDM 2." The plan called for rolling over Croatia and recapturing Slovenia. A plan, consequently, that was never carried out due to only 2 tank brigades remaining in Slovenia at the time of the broadcast, and, according to military experts, a general lack of tactical positioning and absence of the "Partisan Brigades" and other special forces. The report cites the JNA as always having been a symbol of pride for the Partisans' defeat of the Third Reich, but that the Croatian National Guard has come to better represent the needs of its own people. Footage from the short film "Brothers in Arms" is featured, showing scenes of the Croatian National Guard in combat. The short film was shot by Gordan Lederer, a journalist who was killed by a JNA tank on the front. The report states that the Croatian National Guard has combined with police units from the Croatian Interior Ministry, building makeshift armored personnel carriers to raise moral, but remains out-financed, outgunned, and outmanned by JNA forces. Estimates on the total number in the Croatian National Guard are unavailable because of the rapid enlistment at the time of the broadcast. Most are only armed with Kalashnikovs, some only with World War I-era Carbines.

Context

Associated Names
ORF (Producer)